1 op Secret

25X1

Pc 3



Central Intelligence Bulletin

State Department review completed

Top Secret

r 47

22 December 1973

25X1

25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A025900050002-8 25X1 December 22, 1973 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS 25X1 INTERNATIONAL OIL: Large price increases almost 25X1 certain. 25X1 PERU-USSR: Soviets offer to sell patrol boats. 25X1 25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A025900050002-8

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

INTERNATIONAL OIL: SUBSTANTIAL PRICE INCREASES ARE ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE ANNOUNCED BY THE PERSIAN GULF MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC) MEETING IN TEHRAN TODAY. SAUDI OIL MINISTER YAMANI HAS SAID HE WOULD BE THE ONLY MEMBER TRYING TO KEEP THE LID ON PRICES AND WOULD CONSIDER THAT HE HAD DONE A GOOD JOB IF THE PRICE OF PERSIAN GULF CRUDE COULD BE KEPT AS LOW AS \$\delta\$ PER BARREL--AN INCREASE OF ABOUT 70 PERCENT. YAMANI INDICATED THAT RECENT BIDS OF \$\delta\$L-LA PER BARREL FOR GOVERNMENT SALES OF IRANIAN AND NIGERIAN OIL HAD ELATED OTHER PRODUCERS AND BOLSTERED THEIR CONFIDENCE THAT A TRIPLING OR QUADRUPLING OF OIL PRICES COULD BE SUSTAINED IN TODAY'S MARKET.

YAMANI'S OPINION OF THE INTENTION OF OTHER OPEC MEMBERS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE SHAH AND THE US AMBASSADOR.

THE SHAH

IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD TIE CRUDE OIL PRICES TO COSTS

OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ENERGY, WHICH THE SHAH
ESTIMATES ARE THE EQUIVALENT OF \$8-14 PER BARREL.

PRICE INCREASES OF THE MAGNITUDE MENTIONED BY
THE SHAH WOULD HAVE A STRONG IMPACT ON THE BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS OF OIL-CONSUMING NATIONS. LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, WITH LITTLE HARD CURRENCY TO
SPARE, WOULD BE MOST SERIOUSLY AFFECTED UNLESS OPEC
ARRANGED FOR THE SALE OF OIL TO THEM UNDER BARTER
AGREEMENTS.

SKYROCKETING OIL REVENUES OF CERTAIN OIL PRODUCERS--SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, AND LIBYA--WHICH HAVE LIMITED ABILITY TO UTILIZE CAPITAL WOULD CREATE MASSIVE FOREIGN ASSET ACCUMULATION PROBLEMS FOR THESE COUNTRIES AND COULD LEAD TO FURTHER PRODUCTION RESTRICTIONS.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Dec 22, 1973

Central Intelligence Bulletin

3

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A025900050002-8

25X1

PERU-USSR: A SOVIET OFFER TO SELL PATROL BOATS
AND FOTHER EQUIPMENT FOR MAY INDICATE THAT MOSCOW IS
STEPPING UP ITS EFFORTS TO BECOME A SIGNIFICANT
ARMS SUPPLIER IN THE HEMISPHERE. MOSCOW MAY HOPE
THAT PERU AND POSSIBLY OTHER LATIN COUNTRIES WILL
BE LESS HESITANT TO BUY RUSSIAN WEAPONS, NOW THAT
PRESIDENT VELASCO HAS PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE
ARRIVAL OF SOVIET TANKS LAST MONTH.

THE DELIVERY OF AT LEAST 25 AND POSSIBLY 35
MEDIUM TANKS TO PERU--WITH MORE ON ORDER--MARKS
THE FIRST SALE OF MAJOR SOVIET WEAPONRY IN LATIN
AMERICA OUTSIDE OF CUBA. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT PERU
WILL AGREE TO PURCHASE OTHER SOVIET EQUIPMENT, HOWEVER, AT LEAST UNTIL ALL THE TANKS HAVE BEEN DELIVERED AND EVALUATED. SOVIET EFFORTS TO SELL PATROL
BOATS TO PERU ARE NOT NEW; MOSCOW REPORTEDLY OFFERED
THEM AS EARLY AS 1970.

25X1

6

25X1	Top Secret	Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79100975A025900050002-6
'		

Top Secret